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“Focusing on tempting situations in which
cheating allows serving one’s self-interest, we
suggest that cheating is an automatic ten-
dency and that the need for justification
matters only when people have time to delib-
erate” (Shalvi et al., 2012; p. 1264). Foerster
et al. (2013) challenged this proposition.
Here, we review their critique and pro-
pose that their findings do not contradict,
but rather support our observation—that
honesty requires time.
In Shalvi et al. (2012), we stud-
ied whether in tempting, private situa-
tions, time-pressure induces self-serving
behaviors—specifically, lying for profit.
Using a simple die-under-cup task [(Shalvi
et al., 2011a,b; based on Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi (2013)], we asked partici-
pants to roll a die under a paper cup
(ensuring privacy), report the observed
number, and earn money with higher
numbers leading to higher pay. Since only
participants observed the die roll, they
could lie to boost profit. We manipu-
lated the time participants had to report
their outcome. In two experiments, time-
pressure led to higher aggregated reports
than reporting without time-pressure. We
suggested that time-pressure leads peo-
ple to act upon their self-serving desires,
and only with time they calibrate to what
is considered normative (honest) behav-
ior. Recent independent work using the
deception game (Gneezy, 2005) revealed a
similar pattern: contemplating led to less
deception (Gunia et al., 2012).
Foerster et al. (2013) challenged our
work both theoretically and methodologi-
cally. Challenging our theoretical proposi-
tion, they listed research suggesting lying is
more cognitively demanding than honesty
(e.g., Spence et al., 2001; Walczyk et al.,
2009; Debey et al., 2012). This impor-
tant line of work is interesting and makes
sense.When participants are asked to lie or
tell the truth regarding information they
read, it is reasonable that lying requires
more cognitive effort. Our work does not
challenge this line of work, rather, it com-
plements it. Unlike the cited papers, we
focused on situations in which lying is
self-serving. This is fundamentally differ-
ent from lying without a motivation to
do so. Motivation is a strong predictor of
human behavior. We suggest that in tempt-
ing, private settings, and when the lie is
simple to craft, time pressure induces self-
serving behaviors—even lies.
Foerster et al. further challenged cer-
tain aspects of our die-under-cup task sug-
gesting: “As a central feature of the die
under cup paradigm, participants can—in
principle—generate their response before
actually rolling the die” (p. 473). However,
if our participants indeed generated their
responses before rolling, one should not
expect any differences in reported out-
comes between conditions. If participants
decided what to report before rolling, they
should have lied to the same extent regard-
less of being instructed to report quickly or
not. This was not what we found, render-
ing this possibility unlikely.
To overcome the possibility that par-
ticipants were generating responses before
rolling Foester et al. modified our task by
varying “the time available for reflection
about the (dis)honesty of the reports on two
levels: individual die rolls and blocks of rolls”
(p. 473). Participants were instructed to
report the outcome of an 8-sided die in 12
different rolls determining their pay. The
block level time manipulation included six
rolls before and six rolls after a break. This
timemanipulation, rolling before and after
the break, replicated our observation that
honesty requires time (Gunia et al., 2012;
Shalvi et al., 2012). Foerster et al. only
found evidence for lying in the first block
of die rolls, not in the second block.
Foerster et al. using an individual die
roll manipulation, obtained results that
seem contradictory to ours. In the imme-
diate trials, participants reported the out-
comes of three die rolls immediately after
rolling each of them. In the delayed tri-
als, participants observed the outcome of
the roll which they should report, but
reported this outcome after shaking the
die-under-cup another time. This manip-
ulation was employed both before and
after the break. Before the break, partici-
pants lied more in the delayed compared
to the immediate trials. While interesting,
these conditions do not differ from each
other on the key parameter namely, time
pressure. Specifically, the time provided
to report was not manipulated nor mea-
sured. It is unclear if participants took
more time to report their outcomes in the
delayed condition. Moreover, the delayed
trials required participants to report the
die roll outcome after engaging in another
die roll, while the immediate trials did not.
Engaging in the extra roll may increase
lying for two reasons: (1) it may disrupt
deliberation, and/or (2) attract attention
to the potential desired outcomes (i.e.,
high numbers) participants were generat-
ing by rolling again. It is difficult to inter-
pret what was driving participants’ behav-
ior. We believe that this manipulation does
not provide direct evidence to the role of
time in shaping dishonesty. Furthermore,
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it is unclear how it addresses the pos-
sibility of generating responses before
rolling.
CONCLUSION
In Shalvi et al. (2012) we employed a
single-shot, die-under-cup task to study
people’s dishonesty under time-presure.
Participants reported the outcome of a 6-
sided die, rolled under a paper-cup, and
were paid according to a simple payoff
rule. We induced time pressure by ask-
ing participants to report within a short
timeframe, or without such timeframe.
Inducing time pressure increased aggre-
gate dishonesty (see also Gunia et al.,
2012). Foerster et al.’s (2013) multiple
modifications to our original design (e.g.,
8-sided vs. 6-sided die; multiple vs. one-
shot decision; within vs. between-subject
design) make comparing the two studies
difficult. Nevertheless, the observation
that in some settings the immediate deci-
sion is to be honest, seems interest-
ing and deserves further research. In
sum, the time manipulation employed by
Foerster et al., reporting before vs. after
a break, led to another replication of our
observation. Lying was observed only at
the beginning of the experiment, not at
the end. Together, findings from three labs,
employing different methods (Gunia et al.,
2012; Shalvi et al., 2012; Foerster et al.,
2013) suggest that in tempting situations,
honesty requires time.
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